less and passive victims" are largely successful (p. 183). As such, she provides a powerful challenge to the claims of both the Rwandan government and the international community that the RPF's program of national unity and reconciliation is affecting positive change in Rwanda and provides a relevant foundation for further studies of grassroots resistance in other conflicted and postconflict settings. Similarly, it represents a powerful indictment against those regional and international experts who would dismiss the RPF's poor human rights record in the region as somehow justifiable given the positive progress being made in the area of economic development and postgenocide reconciliation, for example. Thomson provides ample evidence that such positive progress is not benefitting all segments of Rwandan society, nor has it been initiated with this intention. Instead, programs like national unity and reconciliation, as perceived by her research participants, are primarily concerned with establishing and maintaining a po liti cal legacy that benefits a select group of politi cal elites, not the Rwandan majority. Bruce K. Rutherford situates Egypt after Mubarak within the po liti cal science literature on hybrid regimes. Prevailing scholarship in this field has focused on election politics and elite bargains in a way that exaggerates the influence regimes exert over other arenas of po liti cal life and sidelines dimensions of politi cal competition not directly related to elections. Rutherford contends that " [t] his emphasis on elections is largely the product of scholars assuming that hybrid regimes are transitioning toward democracy" (p. 23), when in fact they "are not necessarily in transition" but "occupy a stable middle ground between democracy and autocracy" (p. 24). He attempts to deploy a his tori cal institutionalist approach to take stock of the broader context of institutional development and ideational competition that are characteristic of hybrid regimes. But over the course of his laying the theo reti cal groundwork, it becomes increasingly unclear what Rutherford is out to show in this study. He is interested in assessing the future of democracy in the Arab world, on one hand, and in treating hybrid regimes as a distinct and stable regime type, on the other, but does not provide a robust theory to bridge these two inquiries. As a result, it remains ambiguous what contribution Rutherford makes to the study of hybrid regimes or whether he applies his tori cal institutionalism in a novel way. In fact, his engagement with these two literatures ends at chapter one.
Erin Jessee
revieWs Oraby
The book's most general argument is that the economic and ideo logi cal foundations of Husni Mubarak's statist order were eroding in the late 2000s, contrary to other scholarly contentions. Secondly, and more specifically, it argues that a series of economic crises in the 1980s and 1990s precipitated the convergence of liberal po liti cal alternatives between two distinct social groups: proponents of "liberal constitutionalism" (attorneys, but mostly the judiciary) and "Islamic constitutionalism" (Islamic scholars and Muslim Brotherhood activists). The key feature of this convergence is agreement on placing effective constraints on state power, establishing a clear and unbiased legal code, and protecting civil and po liti cal rights while limiting pub lic participation in politics. Rutherford attributes to those businessmen and mem bers of the National Democratic Party pushing for market-oriented economic policies the status of possible allies in the creation of a more liberal state. He maintains that the convergence with regard to certain elements of liberalism did not result from active coordination among these actors, but from the institutional context to which they each responded. He further suggests that the absence of such coordination heightens the chances that " [l] iberalism is likely to progress steadily in the future, while democracy," understood as the regular holding of elections, "is likely to advance slowly and unevenly" (p. 31).
Nevertheless, Rutherford does not address why liberalism is appropriate to the Egyptian context except to say that "West ern ana lysts are accustomed to seeing [liberalism and democracy] merged into a single idea-'liberal democracy.' However, they are different concepts" (p.17). He goes on to define liberalism as "a set of institutions and institutional relationships that constrain state power and protect citizens' civil and po liti cal rights. These institutions include a clear and unbiased legal code, the separation of power, checks and balances among these powers, and effective legal institutions that implement the law" (p. 17). But liberalism is a complex and contested concept, one with a rich intellectual history that he only fleetingly acknowledges (see p. 32, note 2). Rutherford falls short of convincing the reader through his main sourcesEgyptian court rulings, contemporary writings on the relationship among Islam, law, and governance, as well as Muslim Brotherhood parliamentary election literature-that liberalism is the least common denominator for the type of advocacy and ideational competition in which the judiciary and the Muslim Brotherhood are engaged.
Those familiar with the history of Egypt under British occupation will recognize that liberalism only carries immediate relevance to four specific developments in Rutherford's story: 1) the establishment of the Mixed Courts in 1876 based on Napoleonic code and later the National Courts in 1883 that were patterned on the French model; 2) the merging in 1913 of the Legislative Council and the General Assembly into the Legislative Assembly that would formulate legislation and supervise the executive; 3) the consolidation of a cadre of legal professionals trained in the French language and French law; and 4) the Constitution of 1923-modeled on the Belgian Constitutionthat was created after Britain granted Egypt independence in 1922 and was proclaimed the nationalist movement's crowning achievement. Egyptians in all four cases were versed in the ideas of classical liberalism whether by way of their studies in Europe or the French legal education they received in Egypt. Whatever conceptions they maintained about law, a division of power, checks and balances, and respect for basic rights to speech and assembly were the result of a close affinity with the West. Rutherford's aim to account for how the foundations of liberal governance in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries would inform Egyptian judicial activism through the late 2000s thus makes sense.
The same does not hold true in the case of the Islamic constitutionalists (Yusuf al-Qaradawi, Tariq al-Bishri, Kamal Abu al-Majd, and Muhammad Salim al-'Awwa) whose writings Rutherford contends provided the Muslim Brotherhood during the mid-1990s and early 2000s with a moderate conception of Islamic governance. He admits that the four thinkers "do not describe their ideas as 'liberal.' In contemporary Egyptian discourse, this term is associated with West ern po liti cal thought and, particularly, with the British colonial presence in the interwar period . . .The Islamic constitutionalists emphasize that their ideas are derived entirely from Islamic sources and are not drawn from any West ern inspiration" (p. 121 note 204). And yet, Rutherford maintains that "the specific institutional reforms that they advocate can be usefully described as 'liberal' in the sense that they incorporate the key features of classical liberalism" (p. 121). But as one reviewer has already noted, Rutherford may have been better off framing the discussion of Islamic constitutionalist thinking and even judicial activism in terms of communitarianism, which more precisely captures important differences between these two realms of Egyptian politics (Hazbun 2009 ). This is especially so in terms of where each stands in relation to the principle of in di vidual liberty, which some would say is a crucial component of classical liberalism and yet remains absent in Rutherford's definition. His reference to how framers of the Ameri can Constitution are of ten described as liberal despite their illiberal practices (i.e., owning slaves) does not provide adequate justification for deploying the liberalism concept when other frameworks would have been more appropriate. This is not to say that scholars ought to structure po liti cal inquiry exclusively on the basis of local ideas, but it is to point out that how scholars organize a study sheds light on their own biases.
That is exactly what Rutherford's new introduction to the paperback edition reveals. He takes account of po liti cal developments between late 2010 and August 2012, in clud ing the Muslim Brotherhood's parliamentary and presidential victories, major court rulings, and the military's heightened interference in legislative and constitutional matters. Rutherford contends that five actors-liberals, the Muslim Brotherhood, the Salafis, the judiciary, and 
